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A commentary on
The case for social evaluation in preverbal infants: gazing toward one’s goal drives infants’
preferences for Helpers over Hinderers in the hill paradigm
by Hamlin, J. K. (2015). Front. Psychol. 5:1563. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01563
Hamlin (2015) argued that the human capacity for social evaluation begins to emerge just a few
months after birth. This claim derives from studies using unfulfilled goal scenarios, with infants
as young as 3 months of age (see Hamlin, 2013). In a typical “manual choice” experiment, infants
are habituated to multiple helping and hindering events. For example, a protagonist may first fail
to achieve a goal such as climbing a hill. Then, another character pushes the protagonist either up
the hill (the “Helper”) or back down the hill (the “Hinderer”). Following habituation, infants are
presented with the Helper and Hinderer. By 4.5 months of age, infants more often choose to reach
for the Helper than the Hinderer. These results are interpreted as evidence for an early developing
sense of morality (Hamlin, 2013, 2014; c.f. Cowell and Decety, 2015; Salvadori et al., 2015; Scola
et al., 2015).
One potential issue with Hamlin et al.’s (2007) study, proposed by Scarf et al. (2012), is that
the Helper events were confounded with an act of bouncing when the protagonist reached the
hilltop. The current paper, however, showed that this was not the case, and that the direction of
the protagonist’s eye-gaze was the important factor. In this case, children chose the Helper over the
Hinderer more often when the protagonist gazed at the hilltop. Hamlin argued that eye-gaze shows
intent and that infants’ understanding of intent allows them to correctly represent the behavior of
the character as helping or hindering.
Regardless of whether eye-gaze served as a cue to intention, it is not surprising that gaze could
have profound effects on infants’ preferences. Eye contact and following others’ gaze is a crucial
part of our daily interactions. This sensitivity to eyes appears to be highly adaptive (Baron-Cohen,
1995; Langten et al., 2000). Even at birth when infants have poor visual acuity and ocular control,
they have a preference for open over closed eyes (Batki et al., 2000) and direct over averted gaze
(Farroni et al., 2002, 2006). At 6 months of age, an important milestone occurs as infants begin
to follow others’ eye gaze to targets inside their current field of view (D’Entremont et al., 1997;
Gredebäck et al., 2008). The sensitivity to eye-gaze is assumed to have its roots in the evolution of
the morphology of the human eye—which has an unusually high contrast between iris, sclera, and
surrounding skin, enabling the detection of gaze direction from a great distance (Kobayashi and
Kohshima, 1997, 2001; Tomasello et al., 2007).
Although, the eye-gaze is clearly important in the task of Hamlin, it is not entirely clear why.
One possibility is that eye-gaze helps the understanding of intentions. Such an explanation has
been proposed by Baron-Cohen (1994, 1995) who suggested that humans have an eye-direction
detector that detects eye-like stimuli and computes gaze direction. This mechanism in conjunction
with an Intentionality Detector and Shared Attention Mechanism trigger the development of the
Theory-of-Mind-Mechanism (ToMM), which allows mental states, such as people’s intentions, to
be inferred. The actual age at which intentions can be understood, however, is debated with both
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Carpenter et al. (1998) and Tomasello et al. (1993, 2005)
suggesting that such a skill does not emerge until the age of one,
which is older than the children in Hamlin’s (2015) study.
An alternative possibility is that infants prefer an event where
someone “alive” is helped. In this case, infants may be responding
to consistent animate action, regardless of any understanding
of intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005). In particular, gaze may
have been a cue for animacy in Hamlin’s (2015) study when the
climber’s gaze was fixed on the hilltop (see Looser and Wheatley,
2010; Opfer andGelman, 2010). Thus, infants may have preferred
the Helper over the Hinderer in the “animate” condition, as only
the Helper facilitated movements that were consistent with the
previous event of ascending the first incline. If this is correct,
then one would not need to assume infants of 6–11 months must
understand the intentions of the puppet to do the task.
Whether infants’ preference for Helpers is based on an
innate morality remains an open question. Nevertheless,
Hamlin’s (2015) experiments provided novel insights showing
the importance of eye gaze for infants’ choices. Because one has
to understand the other’s intention in order to act prosocially,
future research addressing the question of whether young infants
are truly able to infer from the Protagonist’s gaze to its goals or
if infants’ choices are solely based on their predictions of future
animate action would be of interest.
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